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In 1993, when the ASEAN Regional Forum was about to be established,China was hesitant to join the multilateral regional organisation. Therewas a concern that China might become a target or come under pressure
within the organisation. China ultimately participated after deciding that it
would be better off influencing the forum from within than staying outside.
In the early 1990s, China became involved in sub-regional economic co-op-
eration projects such as the Tumen River Development Programme and the
Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) Co-operation Programme; but its par-
ticipation has markedly increased only in the last decade. By 2001, when
the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation was formed, Chinese leaders were
fully convinced that multilateral regional organisations were significant
mechanisms for China to articulate its interests, strengthen its influence,
cultivate its soft power, and promote multipolarity. In less than a decade,
China was transformed from a passive, defensive participant to an active
organiser with a well-defined agenda and strategy. 
Meanwhile, China has been gradually moving away from the low-profile
foreign policy line suggested by Deng Xiaoping in the wake of the Tianan-
men Incident (1) towards the role of a “responsible stakeholder” in the inter-
national community (2) while pursuing the status and influence of a major
power. Deng Xiaoping’s advocacy of peace and development is nevertheless
still emphasised by the Chinese leadership today. (3) China needs a peaceful
international environment in order to concentrate on its economic devel-
opment, and this in turn requires good relations with its neighbours. To this
end, China wants to minimise the “China threat” perception among its
neighbours. (4) Active participation in regional organisations obviously helps
to realise these objectives as minimum goals.
The Asia-Pacific financial crisis in 1997–1998 offered an important oppor-
tunity for China. The failure of the World Bank and the International Mone-
tary Fund to help facilitated the establishment of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT)
mechanism. China’s refusal to devalue the RMB also impressed ASEAN coun-
tries, which saw China as a responsible major power that respected their in-
terests. The APT mechanism and later the East Asia Summit demonstrate that
enthusiastic participation in regional economic co-operation by major powers
within the region contributes to a strengthening of regional identification. (5)
East Asia certainly feels pressure from the expansion of the European Union
(EU) and the proposed establishment of the Free Trade Area of the Americas.
In November 2007, ASEAN leaders signed the ASEAN Charter, which was de-
clared to be in force in December the following year following completion of
the ratification process by its members. (6)
China’s regional strategy in East Asia is probably still taking shape; and
this strategy is being pursued in an attempt to ensure that China will still
be perceived as a “status quo power.” China has been eager to convince the
international community that it has no intention of being a “revisionist
power” in the era of economic reforms and opening to the outside world. (7)
Its economic achievements demonstrate that it has benefitted from the ex-
isting international economic order, and its rising international status and
influence have greatly reduced its incentive to challenge the existing inter-
national political order, despite concerns that the Western world still wants
to “contain” China. 
On the other hand, the world is becoming increasingly sceptical of China’s
peaceful rise. Since 2010, China has become considerably more assertive in
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territorial disputes with Japan over the Diaoyutai (Senkaku) Islands as well
as with Vietnam, the Philippines, etc., over the Spratlys. There have been
many minor incidents and frequent confrontational naval manoeuvres and
exercises. Meanwhile China’s development of modern weaponry, including
the imminent launch of two aircraft carriers, has also spurred military mod-
ernisation on the part of China’s neighbours. Their adoption of hedging
strategies has led in turn to strengthening their security ties with the US,
facilitating the “return to Asia” policy of the Obama administration. There
is a clear understanding on the part of the Chinese leadership that the coun-
try’s external environment has been deteriorating.
There has been much academic discussion of a status quo-oriented foreign
policy, especially within the school of classical realism. Hans J. Morgenthau
holds that its objective is to maintain the existing distribution of power
within a specific historical era. (8) China’s foreign policy researchers observe
that a status quo-oriented foreign policy does not object to all changes; it
only opposes significant changes such as the transformation of a first-rank
power into a second-rank power. They tend to perceive status quo as an
order that involves both power factors and institutional factors. A change
in status quo cannot be achieved simply by altering the existing distribution
of power; it is definitely accompanied by a change in international institu-
tions. A new order can only be established through the establishment and
acceptance of new institutions in which China will play a much more active
and hopefully constructive role.
Alastair Iain Johnston’s study of Chinese foreign policy has been followed
by many think-tank researchers in Beijing’s foreign policy establishment.
Johnston argues that it cannot be demonstrated that China is a revisionist
power operating outside the international community; instead China has
become increasingly integrated with the international community and has
been more and more co-operative. (9) Despite the rhetoric, it is still unclear
whether China has been actively grooming itself as a counterbalance to the
predominance of the US in a unipolar world. China obviously has been join-
ing an increasing number of international organisations; its level of partic-
ipation is higher than those of other countries with a similar level of
development.
There is no denying that China has been pursuing the status of a major
power. (10) It has spared no effort to protect its sovereignty and territorial
integrity, with an emphasis on independence and unification, and to realise
its modernisation goals. At the same time, it has embraced globalisation
and is prepared to be more integrated with the international community
through more active participation in international institutions. This devel-
opment model has elements of power politics as well as of institutional co-
operation. The former involve the gradual strengthening of China’s military
power, ranging from the development of a credible second strike nuclear
force to that of a blue-water navy to protect its trade routes and territories
in dispute. The latter refer to an emphasis on co-operation and economic
benefit from China’s external economic relations, striving to maintain a
peaceful international environment on a long-term basis to allow China to
concentrate on modernisation through the establishment of and participa-
tion in various bilateral and multilateral institutions and mechanisms. This
participation has to be facilitated by strengthening mutual trust between
China and its neighbours as well as delivering public goods to the regional
and international community. Unfortunately, this mutual trust has been
considerably compromised by China’s recent assertiveness in regional ter-
ritorial disputes. Beijing is aware that China’s socio-economic development
level is still very far behind that of developed countries, and hence China
needs much time and space for development without conflict. In concrete
terms, this means normal if not cordial relations with all major powers, es-
pecially the US, friendly ties with China’s neighbours, and the avoidance of
wars and military conflicts. China will attempt to realise these objectives
on a long-term basis. 
China’s optimal strategy at this stage would be to seek gradual, limited
change while maintaining its “status quo power” image. (11) This change
should ideally be secured through active participation, coalition-building
and even leadership in international institutions. In its formal pronounce-
ments, the Chinese leadership has been articulating the objective of building
a new international order for decades. In 1996, Vice Premier Qian Qichen
proposed a “new security concept” that was further elaborated by President
Jiang Zemin in 1999, advocating principles of mutual trust, mutual benefit,
equality, and co-operation to promote the concept of common security,
mutual security, co-operative security, comprehensive security, and collec-
tive security as the foundation of a new international order. (12) On the eco-
nomic front, Chinese leaders have also indicated that China would adopt a
responsible attitude toward participating in the co-ordination of interna-
tional and regional economic policies to secure a fair and rational new order.
From an offensive realism point of view, China is perceived as exploiting
participation in international institutions and international co-operation to
establish its major power status and image, and to secure the initiative in
enhancing regional cooperation in East Asia. (13)
In the foreign policy section of his report at the Sixteenth Party Congress
held in November 2002, Jiang Zemin elaborated on China’s “periphery diplo-
macy,” indicating that China would uphold the principles of “yu lin wei shan,
yi lin wei ban (do good to neighbouring countries and treat them as part-
ners)” and strengthen regional co-operation, pushing exchanges and co-op-
eration with China’s neighbouring countries to a new level. (14) The following
October, Premier Wen Jiabao addressed the first ASEAN commerce and in-
vestment summit and enunciated the principle of “mulin, anlin, fulin (main-
taining good relations with China’s neighbouring countries, offering them
security and prosperity).” (15) It was in this context that a revised Foreign
Trade Law was implemented in July 2004. In addition to the previous em-
phasis on the principle of equality and mutual benefit, the revised law aimed
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to include: “conclud[ing] or participat[ing] in agreements on customs al-
liance, free trade area agreements and other regional economic and trade
agreements, and participat[ing] in regional economic organisations.” (16) Fi-
nally, at the Seventeenth Party Congress in October 2007, Hu Jintao indi-
cated that China would “implement a free trade area strategy, strengthen
bilateral and multilateral economic and trade co-operation.” (17) By then,
China was clearly defining its regionalism strategy in diplomatic and eco-
nomic terms.
This article intends to examine the objectives of China’s regionalism strat-
egy in East Asia, its options, challenges, and difficulties. The soft power as-
pects of this strategy will also be studied, as well as the strategies of other
major powers in the region and their impact on the Chinese strategy. The
policy measures adopted in pursuit of China’s regionalism strategy will be
carefully analysed to consider its strengths and weaknesses.
Options for China’s regional strategy in East
Asia
At this stage, China aims to strengthen its participation in all major re-
gional organisations and will avoid making its long-term strategy explicit.
China needs a peaceful international environment to concentrate on its
modernisation; and since in many ways China is still a regional rather than
global power, East Asia serves as the basis for it to seek the status and in-
fluence of a major power.
Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum
China’s emphasis is on an East Asian regionalism excluding the US rather
than an Asia Pacific regionalism, as reflected by its continued emphasis on
the “ASEAN Plus Three” approach in regional economic co-operation. Nat-
urally adjustments have to be made in view of the Barack Obama adminis-
tration’s “pivot” toward Asia strategy. Its objective is to promote
multipolarity and reduce the predominance of the US as the sole super-
power globally and regionally. In contrast, the US prefers institutions set in
the wider Asia-Pacific context in which it has more allies sharing common
values. But these institutions, including APEC, are perceived as complemen-
tary diplomatic instruments to its system of bilateral military alliances, es-
pecially its core alliance with Japan. Institutions in which the US participates
are not perceived to pose a threat to its leadership in the region but rather
to consolidate it. (18)
According to the analysis of Zhang Wei, deputy head of the Afro-Asian
research department of the research institute affiliated with China’s Ministry
of Commerce, APEC and Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) are forum-type co-
operation, as opposed to the two other types of economic co-operation in
the Asia-Pacific region, i.e., co-operation based on certain definite mecha-
nisms such as ASEAN Plus Three and the GMS economic co-operation pro-
gramme, and co-operation based on concrete preferential arrangements
such as the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) and the bilateral free
trade agreements (FTA) between China and Chile and between China and
New Zealand. (19)
Apparently China wants to downgrade the importance of APEC. Chinese
leaders would like APEC to continue to operate as an economic co-operation
forum and not move towards a binding-type co-operation; it should con-
centrate on promoting economic and technological co-operation as well as
trade and investment liberalisation in a balanced manner. (20)
The Chinese leadership is aware that the Obama administration will in-
evitably focus on the Middle East and the war on terror followed by North
Korea’s nuclear weapons. The fall from power of the Tunisian and Egyptian
governments and the regional political unrest have absorbed some of the
Obama administration’s attention. Hence APEC for a while was not a priority
concern, and this seemed to be in line with China’s interests. But East Asia
has been accorded prominent priority by the U.S. now. Beijing also under-
stands that the rise of China has become an over-riding issue for US foreign
policy, but it has no intention of confronting the US in APEC. (21) Although
Chinese leaders have been reluctant to involve APEC in the global war on
terrorism given their overt expectation of its role as a forum, they made no
attempt to resist the diplomatic efforts of the Bush administration. China
will remain active in APEC, and will maintain its modus operandi to ensure
that APEC stays on the desired course.
New organisational initiatives
So far, China has offered few significant initiatives concerning institution-
building in the Asia-Pacific or East Asia region. It appears to have an open
mind. In response to the Asia Pacific Community proposal from then Aus-
tralian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, a spokesman of China’s Ministry of For-
eign Affairs indicated that China would adopt an open attitude regarding
any proposal advantageous to the objective of realising common develop-
ment, mutual benefit, and a win-win outcome for the Asia-Pacific region.
The spokesman further stated that China considers enhanced regional co-
operation a trend of the times, and that it hopes that all concerned countries
in the Asia-Pacific region will work together to promote exchanges and
strengthen mutual trust politically. (22) However, China’s academic experts
believe that China, at this stage, will concentrate on co-ordination with the
ASEAN countries and respect ASEAN’s guiding role in regional co-operation,
and that it will support ASEAN Plus Three as the main channel for the pro-
motion of regional co-operation. (23) With new leaders taking power almost
simultaneously in China, Japan and South Korea in 2012, adjustments are
expected on the part of the parties concerned; the expansion of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea
also present new challenges for Beijing. (24)
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Another potential initiative is the Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nu-
clear issue. The negotiations began in 2003, involving the US, China, Japan,
Russia, and the two Koreas with China probably playing the most important
role. When the Six-Party Talks made some progress, there was optimism
that the negotiations might become a permanent security forum for East
Asia. In April 2009, Pyongyang declared that it was pulling out of the Six-
Party Talks in response to international criticisms of its controversial long-
range rocket test. (25) In May that year, North Korea conducted its second
nuclear explosion, and tension escalated in the Korean peninsula. Under
such circumstances, there was no more suggestion of turning the talks into
a permanent security forum. It is now amply clear that China’s influence on
Pyongyang remains limited, and that North Korea is more interested in di-
rect negotiations with the US. Pyongyang’s nuclear test in 2013 is embar-
rassing for Beijing; and there are suggestions that the Chinese leadership
may have to re-think its policy towards North Korea.
In the initial stages of the Six-Party Talks, however, Beijing had indicated
considerable enthusiasm for its institutionalisation. In November 2003,
when then Chinese vice minister of foreign affairs Dai Bingguo visited Japan,
he reportedly argued that institutionalising the Six-Party Talks would be the
only way to make them sustainable in view of the lack of confidence and
trust among the countries involved. Moreover, it would facilitate better im-
plementation of the agreements reached, and might eventually strengthen
the chance of building a security regime based on multilateralism and re-
gionalism in East Asia. (26) Beijing’s interpretation of institutionalisation was
to transform the Six-Party Talks into a permanent regional security dialogue
through the establishment of a “special small group” consisting of repre-
sentatives of the six countries at vice minister or bureau director rank. (27)
This would then act as the Six-Party Talks representative group. Beijing’s
position demonstrates that it supports an institutionalised regional security
dialogue for Northeast Asia, especially when it holds the initiative.
On the financial front, the establishment of the “Asian dollar” is a very
distant possibility, though Beijing has some success in promoting the use
of the yuan in bilateral trade settlements. In May 2009, the finance ministers
of China, Japan, and South Korea reached a consensus on the establishment
of a regional foreign exchange reserve within the ASEAN Plus Three frame-
work. China and Japan would offer US$38.4 billion each and South Korea
US$19.2 billion, together constituting 80% of the reserve, which would
begin operation at the end of the year. This was a response to the present
global financial crisis, and it aims to maintain the stability of regional cur-
rencies in a financial crisis, reducing regional states’ dependence on the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF). This reserve obviously may serve as the
foundation for the establishment of an “Asian Monetary Fund” and even an
“Asian dollar” as the regional currency. (28) The reserve was built on the Chi-
ang Mai Initiative (CMI) initiated in 2000 by the ASEAN Plus Three in re-
sponse to the Asia-Pacific financial crisis in 1997–1998; and it was basically
a series of bilateral currency swap arrangements between countries of the
group. It was the first step in regional financial co-operation in Asia but was
linked to an IMF programme; it was further handicapped by the shortage of
available funds and the lack of a central body. (29)
China’s Ministry of Commerce had earlier stated that an Asian currency
unit would enhance the Chinese RMB’s status and influence in Asia, and
would strengthen the co-operation between China and other Asian coun-
tries. (30) It is certainly in line with Beijing’s proposal for an international re-
serve currency in the long term, put forward in 2009 in the aftermath of
the global financial crisis, and with the objective of weakening US influence
in Asia, but development will take a great deal more time. Meanwhile, China
will concentrate on wider use of the RMB in international trade in prepara-
tion for it eventually becoming a hard currency.
ASEAN Plus Three
The IMF and, to a lesser extent, the World Bank’s clumsy handling of
the Asia-Pacific financial crisis in 1997 made Southeast Asian countries
realise that they needed a regional mechanism that could react to an
impending crisis in a timely manner; this realisation led to the emergence
of the CMI and its later developments. (31) The discrediting of the Wash-
ington consensus, (32) the inaction on the part of APEC, and US opposition
to the establishment of an Asian Monetary Fund all provided impetus to
the establishment of the ASEAN Plus Three mechanism, and persuaded
the countries concerned to downplay earlier hesitation to implement the
East Asia Economic Group proposal initiated by then Malaysian Prime
Minister Mahathir Mohamad in December 1990. (33)
By then, members of ASEAN Plus Three all appreciated the development
of international production chains linking them together, and the demand
for further regional economic integration to facilitate the freer flow of
goods, services, and investment on the part of multinational corporations.
There was also awareness that East Asia’s regional economic integration
was very much behind the progress of the EU and the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Meanwhile, the stagnation of the
Doha round of trade negotiations encouraged the proliferation of a mul-
titude of bilateral and regional free trade agreements, and ASEAN Plus
Three was a timely response to this development.
China apparently found the ASEAN Plus Three arrangement highly sat-
isfactory; the exclusion of the US was an obvious factor. The fact that it
emerged partly as an outcome of dissatisfaction with the IMF and APEC
was interpreted as a decline in US influence in the region. In Decem-
ber 1997, the leaders of ASEAN and China held their first informal summit
(ASEAN Plus One) and released a Joint Statement on the establishment
of a partnership of good neighbourliness and mutual trust towards the
twenty-first century. The partnership was subsequently upgraded to a
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strategic partnership for peace and prosperity in October 2003. (34) Be-
tween 1998 and 2000, China signed framework documents on bilateral
relations or announced co-operation programmes with each of the ten
ASEAN member states. (35) By 2005, a total of 46 mechanisms at various
levels in 16 fields, including 12 at the ministerial level, had been estab-
lished between China and ASEAN. In comparison, only 15 similar mecha-
nisms existed between the US and ASEAN, despite the fact that the US
was the most significant supporter of ASEAN at its birth in 1967. (36)
In 2001, ASEAN and China identified agriculture, information technol-
ogy, human resource development, mutual investment, and Mekong River
Basin development as the five priority areas for co-operation in the early
years of the twenty-first century. In 2002, a Framework Agreement on
Comprehensive Economic Co-operation was signed to establish a free
trade area (FTA) covering the six old ASEAN states by the year 2010 and
covering all ten ASEAN members by 2015. Today, ASEAN has emerged as
the third largest trading partner of China, ahead of Japan and just behind
the European Union and the US.
Although China and ASEAN have been improving their relationship
within the ASEAN Plus Three mechanism, progress in strengthening re-
gional cooperation has been relatively slow because of the competition
between China and Japan. In the first place, there are three ASEAN Plus
One mechanisms within the ASEAN Plus Three framework between
China, Japan, and South Korea respectively and the regional group. When
China concluded its FTA agreement with ASEAN, Japan and South Korea
felt the acute pressure of being left behind and immediately followed in
China’s footsteps.
Later in the development of the East Asia Summit (EAS), there was keen
competition between two different views. In the final report of the East
Asian Study Group delivered in 2002, the EAS was supposed to include
only members of the ASEAN Plus Three, (37) and China was happy with
this line of development. But then Japan, Indonesia, and Singapore again
asked for the inclusion of Australia, New Zealand, and India. Apparently
Malaysia was the only country that articulated reservations. The expan-
sion of EAS from 13 to 16 members was related to the consideration of
most ASEAN members that this arrangement would make it easier for
ASEAN to maintain leadership. (38) As one researcher in the think tank of
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated, this expansion of member-
ship challenged China’s previously favourable position in the EAS
process. (39) China was further disappointed when ASEAN decided not to
hold the second EAS in Beijing as China requested, but to ensure that the
next and subsequent summits would be held in ASEAN countries only.
More significant still, in 2010, the EAS further expanded to include the
US and Russia; under such circumstances, China would have to focus
again on ASEAN Plus Three.
In sum, China’s preferred regionalism strategy in East Asia would be the
ASEAN Plus Three approach, which excludes the US and allowed more
room for China to maximise its influence. In this approach, China hopes
to win over ASEAN and persuade South Korea to support its position.
However, progress has not been smooth and China explicitly would like
to keep all options open at this stage while the pressure of TPP increas-
ingly looms large. China considers keeping a relatively low profile a pru-
dent way of minimising resistance to its attempts to enhance its
influence on the part of the major powers involved in the region as well
as reducing suspicion and the sense of insecurity on the part of lesser re-
gional powers.
Diplomatic and security challenges and
difficulties in China’s regionalism strategy in
East Asia
While China’s approach to various regional international institutions re-
veals the strengths and weaknesses of its regionalism strategy in East Asia,
there are also diplomatic and security challenges based on its own values
and foreign policy orientations as well as those of other countries involved
in the region. 
Sovereignty and institutionalisation
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) traditionally considered the struggle
against imperialism and the abrogation of the unequal treaties imposed on
China its sacred missions. According to Shan Wenhua, while China today still
maintains the “inviolability of sovereignty” position, it really refers to the “ab-
stract sovereignty” concept, which only means that China, as a sovereign state,
should retain ultimate control over its domestic affairs and enjoy an equal
standing in the international community. Yet at the “concrete sovereignty”
level, the Chinese authorities accept that specific sovereign powers may be di-
vided, allocated, delegated, or transferred after a cost-benefit analysis. For ex-
ample, since the 1990s, the Chinese government has reversed its position and
has decided to accept the granting of national treatment and access to inter-
national dispute settlement forums in bilateral investment treaties. (40)
The concept of sovereignty is also controversial in regional natural disaster
relief, an important element in China’s increasing concern over its involve-
ment in non-traditional security issues. This controversy was highlighted by
the devastation of Cyclone Nargis, which struck Myanmar in early May 2008
and posed a problem to the Chinese leadership in view of China’s support
for Myanmar. Under what circumstances would China accept that human
security, which the international community has increasingly adopted as
the norm for its rescue operations in recent years, takes precedence over
traditional security based on national sovereignty? In the Myanmar case,
China, Russia, South Africa, and Vietnam opposed the Responsibility to Pro-
tect doctrine and United Nations Security Council intervention to deliver
relief supplies to stricken areas in Myanmar without the consent of its gov-
ernment. (41) In the foreseeable future, this position on the part of China will
facilitate Beijing’s approach to the CLMV group of countries (i.e., Cambodia,
Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam) within ASEAN, but will continue to attract
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criticisms from the US and the Western countries and will be a bone of con-
tention in the Sino-American competition for regional influence.
Today China faces a new challenge as the Myanmar leadership makes lim-
ited steps towards political liberalization to secure better relations with the
US and EU in return for aid, trade and hopefully investment. Chinese leaders
realize that Myanmar’s dependence on China will decline, but they are pre-
pared to maintain a close relationship with its neighbour while facing much
keener competition.
In the pursuit of strengthening regional cooperation, the Chinese authorities
accept that a much more flexible concept of “concrete sovereignty” is es-
sential. Since the turn of the century, there have been many indications that
the Chinese leadership has decided to pursue an active and constructive role
in international organisations. The EU serves as a very useful reference. Many
Chinese scholars perceive the European model as dealing with international
relations via “institutionalisation” and “the construction of multilateral in-
stitutions”; the “institution” is a crucial pillar of the EU’s “civilian power” and
the main source of its influence. (42) Chinese academics in the field of inter-
national relations have shown a strong interest in three major EU approaches:
common security (as opposed to absolute security), multilateralism (as op-
posed to unilateralism), and a global treatment of international problems
and crisis (as opposed to short-term and ex post solutions). The promotion
of common security emphasises regional security as well as economic and
political means, and deals with international crisis through internal and ex-
ternal co-operation as well as economic and cultural exchanges. (43)
Great power ambitions, lack of trust and hedging
strategy
In the 1990s, China was more interested in promoting multipolarity as
well as establishing strategic partnerships and various types of partnerships
to reduce US influence. (44) In the past decade or so, China has toned down
its confrontational rhetoric about American “hegemonism.” Worries of US
containment have re-emerged in the official media since 2010, however,
and they seem to have been strengthening. Chinese leaders has been trying
hard to assume a constructive role in resolving international disputes or al-
leviating tension, as well as demonstrating a diplomatic activism involved
in multilateral mechanisms and collective security and promoting win-win
solutions to international problems. In the East Asian context, China has
been promoting good-neighbourly relations and regional cooperation.
The most serious limit to the EU model’s influence on China’s regionalism
strategy in East Asia, however, is the great power ambitions of China and
other major powers in the region, including the US, Russia, Japan, and
India. (45) The present Chinese leadership continues to identify the US as
China’s principal external threat, while the US-Japan alliance places Japan
in the same category with the US; Japan is also perceived as an important
competitor in the East Asia region. Although China has succeeded in reduc-
ing the “China threat” perception (46) on the part of ASEAN countries to a
considerable extent, many of them still adopt a policy of “hedging” against
China, i.e., engaging China while enhancing ties with other extra-regional
powers so as to balance China. (47) China’s assertiveness in territorial issues
and maritime rights has in fact strengthened such hedging strategies since
2010. As argued by Sheng Lijun, a strong but balanced relationship with the
US serves not only as security insurance but also as an incentive to persuade
China to make more economic concessions. “Ironically, the more China
pushes in deepening its relations with ASEAN, the more ASEAN may feel
that it needs a strong relationship with other extra-regional powers to keep
the balance.” (48)
ASEAN countries’ adoption of a “hedging” strategy reflects the lack of
trust and confidence among members of ASEAN Plus Three. Regionalism in
Northeast Asia must be realised as a pre-requisite to East Asian regionalism,
and the lack of close regional cooperation in Northeast Asia is because
China and Japan cannot co-operate to support the objective. There are other
factors as well, including animosity arising from past relations among the
regional states; differences in political and social systems; discrepancies in
economic development levels; and a long tradition of ethnic homogeneity
that does not allow nations to be susceptible to the concept of integrating
with others. (49)
The history textbook issue and Koizumi Junichiro’s visits to the Yasukuni
Shrine while he was Japan’s prime minister (2001-2006) caused severe set-
backs in Sino-Japanese relations and blocked any significant progress in re-
gionalism in Northeast Asia and East Asia. It symbolically reflected the
problem caused by rising nationalism in both countries and their gradual
loss of vision and tolerance to tackle difficulties. Some academics would
argue that this lack of trust can be traced to earlier developments. After the
Taiwan Straits crisis in 1996, the strengthening of the “hedging” strategy on
the part of the US and Japan was reflected by their subsequent reforming
of their alliance structure. (50) Sino-Japanese mutual suspicions were then
further exacerbated during the Asia-Pacific financial crisis in 1997, when
China and Japan revealed a reluctance to engage in full co-operation and a
sense of competition in supporting ASEAN. (51) The Japanese now feel very
uncomfortable with a rising China as the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/
Senkaku Islands has been deteriorating since the late 2000s. China’s policy
towards Japan is perceived as probably the most serious problem in its for-
eign relations and Chinese leaders believe that they cannot afford to be
seen to be weak in dealing with Japan because of domestic nationalist pres-
sure.
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The above difficulties might have encouraged the Northeast Asian
states to actively pursue cooperation with Southeast Asia on an indi-
vidual basis; but this is not sustainable in the long term if the former do
not seriously move to strengthen trust and co-operation among them-
selves. After the stepping down of Koizumi Junichiro, there was some
progress in co-operation among China, Japan, and South Korea. In the
autumn of 2006, Abe Shinzo visited China; the “ice-breaking trip” re-
sulted in a joint press statement indicating that both countries would
aim to build a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strate-
gic interests. Sino-Japanese relations continued to improve on this basis.
When Hu Jintao visited Japan in May 2008, the two governments signed
a Joint Statement on Comprehensive Promotion of a Mutually Beneficial
Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interest regarded as the
“fourth important political document” guiding the bilateral relationship.
In the following month, Beijing and Tokyo announced an agreement to
establish a joint development zone in the northern section of the East
China Sea; and for Japanese companies to participate in the Chunxiao
gas field (Shirakaba in Japanese), where China had already begun devel-
opment, according to Chinese law. The agreement would not compro-
mise territorial claims on the disputed islands by both sides.
Unfortunately these efforts came to nothing as the Diaoyu/ Senkaku Is-
lands territorial dispute escalated.
After one year, the first prime minister of the Democratic Party of Japan
(DPJ), Hatoyana Yukio, was replaced by Kan Naoto. Japan experts in China
blamed the shifting of the factional balance within the DPJ government
for the mishandling of the fishing boat incident in September 2010. The
detention and prosecution of the Chinese boat captain by the local court
in Japan was perceived to have gone beyond the normal pattern and an
attempt to strengthen Japan’s sovereignty claims over the Diaoyu/
Senkaky Islands. When in 2012, the Tokyo governor, Ishihara Shintaro,
raised funds to purchase two of the islands from the Japanese private
owner, the territorial dispute furhter escalated. The Chinese authorities
and the people did not accept that the intervention by the Noda Yoshihiko
administration to acquire the islands was an attempt to defuse the issue.
At the end of May 2008, the China-South Korea summit talks also led
to the upgrading of the bilateral relationship to a “strategic partnership”
and plans for the two governments to negotiate a free trade agreement.
The improvement in relations among China, Japan, and South Korea and
the global financial crisis prompted their closer co-operation in the fi-
nancial field. In May 2009, the three countries agreed to contribute to
a regional foreign exchange reserve fund serving ASEAN Plus Three, of-
fering member countries liquidity when they were in difficulty in a fi-
nancial crisis. This reserve fund might lead to the establishment of the
Asian Monetary Fund and even an Asian currency unit in the future. (52)
The North Korean government’s sinking of the Cheonan corvette and
the shelling of the Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, followed by the nuclear
and missile tests in 2012 almost reduced the Six-Party Talks to bank-
ruptcy. The Chinese leadership feeds that its support for Pyongyang has
not delivered results, instead the Kim regime’s aggression has con-
tributed to the strengthening of the US’s security ties with Japan and
South Korea to the disadvantage of China. The Chinese intelligentsia has
started to question China’s policy towards North Korea. In 2013, there
are no indications yet that the new Chinese leadership would initiate a
rethink of the bilateral relationship, but there seems to be obvious dis-
appointment on the part of Beijing.
Soft power (53)
When Chinese leaders began to engage in multilateral diplomacy at the
end of the Cold War, they might not have been aware of the need to culti-
vate China’s soft power. Today, they probably have a well-planned design
to exploit international institutions and non-government organisations
(NGOs) as global platforms to promote multilateral co-operation in various
spheres, so as to cultivate a peaceful international environment to facilitate
China’s development. This design also serves China’s regional strategy in
East Asia. 
As argued by Joshua Cooper Ramo, the Chinese model has begun to alter
global development parameters in the economic, social, and political as-
pects. China thus has been able to reduce the influence of the US, which is
perceived to have been promoting its interests unilaterally. China’s devel-
opment model offers new ideas to guide developing countries to protect
their respective lifestyles and political options, and to realise genuine inde-
pendence while converging with the international order in their respective
development courses. The 2008 global financial crisis has further discredited
the “Washington consensus” as the Bush and the Obama administrations
have pursued a course of action condemned by the US authorities during
the previous regional financial crises. Meanwhile, China has a good oppor-
tunity to seek a louder voice in the international financial restructuring and
to better articulate the interests of developing countries.
Chinese leaders have also been building various international forums since
the turn of the century to engage in Track-2  dialogue, including the
Boao Forum for Asia in 2001; it aims at dialogues and exchanges with other
regions to strengthen economic ties within Asia and between Asia and the
external world. In 2002, after a visit to Peking University by a higher edu-
cation delegation from South Korea, both parties reached agreement to
hold the first annual meeting of the Beijing Forum on “The Harmony of
Civilisations and Prosperity for All” in August 2004. Then, in May 2005,
Fudan University hosted the Shanghai Forum on “Economic Globalisation
and the Choice of Asia” involving academics, experts, entrepreneurs, and
politicians from various countries to discuss the challenges of globalisa-
tion. (54) The hosting of international forums at the civil society level has
now become a trend in China’s major cities as well, and “sister city” rela-
tionships continue to multiply, as reflected by the annual reports of the Chi-
nese foreign ministry.
The spread of Chinese culture and language now constitutes an important
element in the cultivation of China’s soft power. Following the examples of
the British Council, the Alliance Française, the Goethe-Institut, etc., China
has initiated its Confucius Institutes project. Following the launch of the
first Confucius Institute in Seoul on 21 November 2004, there were 400
Confucius Institutes in more than 50 countries by the end of 2012. (55) The
Institutes offer five types of services: promotion of Chinese-language teach-
ing; training of Chinese-language teachers and provision of Chinese-lan-
guage teaching resources; holding Chinese-language examinations and
certification of Chinese-language teachers; information and consultation
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services on Chinese education and culture; and development of language
and cultural exchanges between China and foreign countries. 
The Confucius Institutes are example of the Chinese authorities’ attempts
to exploit the soft power of Chinese heritage; in recent years they have also
been spending substantial resources to establish global media conglomer-
ates to influence international public opinion. So far the impact remains
limited. The fatal weakness appears to be that China’s media do not enjoy
freedom and autonomy, and as such they lack credibility and appeal. Unless
the Chinese leadership is ready to accept freedom of the media, the pursuit
of influence in international discourse will be an uphill task. At the same
time, China’s assertiveness in handling territorial disputes and maritime
rights has also led to nationalist feelings in the region against China, reduc-
ing its appeal.
Economic challenges and difficulties in
China’s regionalism strategy in East Asia
China’s major economic power status in East Asia is based on its impres-
sive economic growth, rapid increases in industrial production and trade,
and the expansion of its domestic market. To the countries of ASEAN Plus
Three, China’s economic development and rise in purchasing power have
been serving as an engine for regional economic growth, a market for their
exports, and outlet for their investment. China’s attraction of external in-
vestment, trade, and commerce activities in turn enhances the region’s eco-
nomic vitality and international competitiveness. (56) Hence China’s
economic development has been an asset for the promotion of regional
economic integration and regionalism. Chinese leaders further appeal for
the establishment of a new international political and economic order, re-
spect for diversity among countries in the region, and the promotion of
global economic relations based on equality, mutual benefit, and win-win
scenarios so as to protect the interests of developing countries. (57)
In terms of intra-regional trade share and the trade intensity index in
East Asia, there is a good foundation for regional economic integration (see
Table 1); and it is obvious that ASEAN Plus Three is the only viable grouping,
comparing favourably with the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA)
and not too far behind the EU prior to its further expansion in this century.
ASEAN as a group is too dependent on external markets, and it also relies
heavily on investment from outside the region.
Table 2 provides a summary of ASEAN free trade agreements and regional
trade agreements that have largely been concluded in recent years. They
reflect a disappointment with the lack of progress in the promotion of free
trade within the global WTO framework as well as keen interest in the es-
tablishment of partial free trade areas within the ASEAN Plus Three frame-
work after the Asia-Pacific financial crisis in 1997 and especially after
China’s approach to ASEAN in the beginning of the twenty-first century.
The impact of this “spaghetti bowl” of FTAs is mixed, as shown by Table 3.
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Exports
1986/87 29.3 24.1 20.9 9.8 45.1 66.6
1994/95 49 38 32.6 20.8 44.2 64.8
2006/07 44.5 34.4 31.5 18.9 48.4 59.5
Imports
1986/87 41.5 24.6 29.8 8.6 31.8 66.3
1994/95 55.7 36.4 39.9 16.6 38 63.9
2006/07 62.7 47.2 47.9 22.8 34.1 58
1986/87 34.4 24.3 24.5 9.2 37.3 66.5
1994/95 52.1 37.2 35.9 18.4 40.8 64.3
2006/07 52.1 40.2 38.7 21.2 40 58.7
Table 1 – Intra-Regional Shares of Non-oil Trade (%) in 1986/87, 1994/95, and 2006/07 (a)
Total non–oil trade (b)
Total trade (exports + imports)
(a) – Two-year averages; 
(b) – Total merchandise trade excluding oil and gas (SITC 3)





ASEAN +3 ASEAN NAFTA EU-15
The ASEAN Free Trade Area officially came into existence in 2002; and al-
though the six long-standing members agreed to reduce tariffs on one an-
other’s goods to a maximum of 5%, non-tariff barriers and excise duties
remain in place. More significant still, where manufacturing industries might
benefit from economies of scale and an integrated internal market, ASEAN
governments remain stubbornly protectionist; the Malaysian carmaker Pro-
ton has been an obvious example. (58) In absolute terms, intra-ASEAN trade
increased from US$159.91 billion in 2002 to US$598.24 billion in 2011; but
in terms of trade share, intra-ASEAN trade increased from 22.4% of the
total in 2002 to 25.1% in 2003, but remained roughly at the same level af-
terwards, remaining at 25% in 2011 (see Table 3). In the case of Japan, its
share of ASEAN trade declined from 15.3% in 2000 to 11.4% in 2011,
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China (2010); India (2009); Japan (Comprehen-
sive Economic Partnership, 2003); Korea
(Goods and Services, 2005; Investment, 2009);
Australia & New Zealand (2009)
Korea; EU; US (TIFA)
Brunei Darussalam Yes / Yes
AFTA (1992); Japan (Economic Partnership
Agreement, 2008)
US (TIFA)
Cambodia Yes / No AFTA (1992) US (TIFA)
Indonesia Yes / Yes
AFTA (1992); Japan (Economic Partnership
Agreement, 2007)
US (TIFA)
Lao PDR No / No AFTA (1992) –
Malaysia Yes / Yes
AFTA (1992); Japan (Economic Partnership
Agreement, 2005); Pakistan (Closer Economic
Partnership Agreement, 2007)
Australia; India (Comprehensive Economic Co-
operation Agreement); Korea; New Zealand; US
(TIFA); EU; Chile
Myanmar Yes / No AFTA (1992) –
Philippines Yes / Yes
AFTA (1992); Japan (Economic Partnership
Agreement, 2006)
US (TIFA)
Singapore Yes / Yes
AFTA (1992); New Zealand (2000); EFTA
(2002); Japan (2002); Australia (2003); US
(2003); Jordan (2004); India (2005); Korea
(2005); Panama (2005); Trans-Pacific SEP
(Brunei, New Zealand, Chile, Singapore) 
(2005); China (2008); Peru (2008); 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (2008)
Canada; Mexico; Pakistan; Ukraine; EU
Thailand Yes / Yes
AFTA (1992); Bahrain (2002); China (Preferen-
tial Trade Agreement on Agriculture, 2003);
India (Early Harvest, 2003); Peru (Closer Eco-
nomic Partnership, 2003; Early Harvest, 2005);
Australia (2004); New Zealand (2005); Japan
(Closer Economic Partnership, 2007); Korea
(2009)
US (TIFA); Peru; India; EFTA
Vietnam Yes / Yes
AFTA (1992); Japan (Economic Partnership
Agreement, 2009)
Chile; Japan; EU (Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement); US (TIFA)
Table 2 – ASEAN Free Trade Agreements and Regional Trade Agreements 
Sources: US-ASEAN Business Council, www.us-asean.org/ASEAN/FTA_Matrix.doc (accessible on 20 March 2013); ASEAN Secretariat, “Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation
Between the Republic of India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Bali, 8 October 2003,” www.aseansec.org/22563.htm (accessible on 20 March 2013); ASEAN Secretariat, “Joint Media Statement
on the Signing of the Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area, Cha-am, Thailand, 27 February 2009,” www.aseansec.org/22255.htm (accessible on 20 March 2013); ASEAN
Secretariat, “China Ready to Accommodate on ASEAN-China FTA,” 22 January 2010, www.aseansec.org/24209.htm (accessible on 20 March 2013); ASEAN Secretariat, “The Sixth AEM–ROK Consultation, 15
August 2009, Bangkok, Thailand – Joint Media Statement,” www.aseansec.org/JMS-6th-AEM-ROK.pdf (accessible on 20 March 2013); ASEAN Secretariat, “ASEAN and India Sign the Much Awaited Free Trade
Area,” 13 August 2009, www.aseansec.org/PR-ASEAN-India-Sign-Much-Awaited-FTA.pdf (accessible on 20 March 2013); “Japan-Brunei FTA Takes Effect Thursday,” TMCnet.com, 30 July 2008,
www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2008/07/30/3576562.htm (not accessible on 20 March 2013); Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation, “Malaysia-Pakistan Closer Economic Partnership Agreement,”
www.matrade.gov.my/cms/content.jsp?id=com.tms.cms.article.Article_hide_MalaysiaPakistan (not accessible on 20 March 2013); Government of Singapore, “FTAs,” www.fta.gov.sg/sg_fta.asp (accessible
on 20 March 2013); Department of Trade Negotiations, Ministry of Commerce, Thailand, www.thaifta.com/english/index_eng.html; Vietnam Foreign Trade Office in Japan, “Japan Approved Economic
Partnership Agreement with Vietnam,” www.moit.gov.vn/vsi_portlets/portlet_action/cmsportlet/printarticle?arcId=4194 (not accessible on 20 March 2013), 26 June 2009; “Vietnam and Chile to Sign FTA
Soon,” Communist Party of Vietnam Online Newspaper, 17 May 2009, www.cpv.org.vn/cpv/Modules/News_English/News_Detail_E.aspx?CN_ID=340759&CO_ID=30180 (accessible on 20 March 2013);
Department of Trade Negotiations, Thailand, www.thaifta.com/; and “Thai-Korean FTA offers ray of hope to businesses,” Bangkok Post, 28 February 2009, www.bangkokpost.com/business/economics/
12488/thai-korean-fta-offers-ray-0f-hope-to-businesses (not accessible on 20 March 2013).
Notes: 1. AFTA: ASEAN Free Trade Agreement; EFTA: The European Free Trade Association (member countries: Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway); SEP: Strategic Economic Partnership; and TIFA:
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement.
2. The above data do not include other types of regional co-operation such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) involving Bangladesh, Bhutan,
India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.
though in absolute terms, Japan-ASEAN trade increased from US$116.19
billion to US$273.35 billion in the same period. Sino-ASEAN trade, as ex-
pected, did remarkably well; it rose from US$32.32 billion (4.3% of ASEAN’s
total trade) in 2000 to US$280.41 billion (11.7% of ASEAN’s total) in 2011.
The China-ASEAN Free Trade Area was formally launched on 1 January 2010,
hence the process of tariff reduction and elimination will continue to step up
in the coming years (see Table 4). China has been the largest trade partner of
ASEAN since 2012, but substantial trade with Japan, EU and the US will allow
ASEAN to maintain a balance of power in trade terms. This symmetry is
healthy for regional economic integration. As indicated by Table 2, various free
trade/tariff reduction arrangements in East Asia have been and will be imple-
mented in the decade or so following 2006; this process will likely raise the
respective shares of ASEAN trade for China, Japan, and South Korea.
Closer examination reveals that China’s economic influence in Southeast
Asia is considerably weaker than depicted by the international media. From
1995 to 2003, China’s investment in ASEAN constituted 0.29% of the total
foreign investment in ASEAN, as compared with 28.83% for the EU, 16.47% for
the US, and 12.9% for Japan. (59) In 2011, ASEAN foreign direct investment (FDI)
from China only amounted to 5.3% of the ASEAN total, compared with Japan’s
13.2% of the ASEAN total (see Table 5). However, given China’s more than
US$2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves and its “going out” investment strat-
egy abroad, China’s investment in ASEAN will certainly continue to increase
in the foreseeable future. Moreover, China’s official statistics have not taken
into consideration investment by small and medium-sized enterprises as well
as by foreign subsidiaries of major enterprises not reported to the Ministry of
Commerce. Notwithstanding these adjustments, China’s share of foreign in-
vestment in ASEAN remains relatively small at this stage.
In terms of foreign aid, China has been offering more government economic
aid to ASEAN since 2005, especially to Indonesia, Cambodia, the Philippines,
and Myanmar. But the main beneficiaries of China’s expanding foreign aid
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59. These figures are from the ASEAN Secretariat, quoted from www.cafta.org.cn. See also “Dong-
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companies “going out”), Guoji gongcheng yu laowu (International projects and labour), No. 10,
October 2005, quoted from www.cafta.org.cn.
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Table 3 – Intra and Extra-ASEAN Trade, 1993–2011 (US$ billion)
Sources: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2006, Jakarta, The ASEAN Secretariat, 2007; and Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2008,










Notes: 1. Figures may not add up to totals due to rounding off.
2. * All figures are preliminary, with Cambodia being estimated using trade growth as in World Bank, World Bank Economic Update for the East Asia and Pacific Region, April 2009, www.worldbank.org.
Year
Amount % of Total Amount % of Total Amount % of Total Amount % of Total
1993 82.44 19.2 347.5 80.8 8.87 2.1 86.66 20.2
1994 105.48 20.5 408.52 79.5 11.06 2.2 101.6 19.8
1995 123.78 20.1 491.47 79.9 13.33 2.2 121.22 19.7
1996 145.18 21.5 528.78 78.5 16.69 2.5 116.46 17.3
1997 149.97 21.5 548.67 78.5 22.65 3.2 113.27 16.2
1998 120.92 21 455.19 79 20.41 3.5 81.41 14.1
1999 132.67 21.3 490.48 78.7 21.92 3.5 89.15 14.3
2000 166.85 22 592.25 78 32.32 4.3 116.19 15.3
2001 150.32 21.8 540.67 78.2 31.92 4.6 101.51 14.7
2002 159.91 22.4 553.91 77.6 42.76 6 97.59 13.7
2003 206.73 25.1 617.81 74.9 59.64 7.2 113.4 13.8
2004 260.7 24.3 811.15 75.7 89.07 8.3 143.26 13.4
2005 304.89 24.9 920 75.1 113.39 9.3 153.83 12.6
2006 352.77 25.1 1.052.03 74.9 139 9.9 161.8 11.5
2007 401.92 25 1.208.87 75 171.12 10.6 173.06 10.7
2008* 458.04 26.8 1.252.33 73.2 192.53 11.3 211.99 12.4
2009 376.21 24.5 1.160.64 75.5 178.19 11.6 160.86 10.5
2010 520 25.4 1.523.00 74.6 231.22 11 203.9 10
2011 598.24 25 1.790.35 75 280.41 11.7 273.35 11.4
ASEAN Trade with JapanASEAN Trade with ChinaExtra-ASEAN TradeIntra-ASEAN Trade
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programme are African countries; and in Asia, the principal recipient has been
North Korea (probably receiving a third or more of the total). (60)
The limited influence of the substantial China-ASEAN trade lies in the fact
that most of it is in the hands of multinational corporations (MNCs), which
accounted for 60.6% of the bilateral trade in 2005. (61) This was mainly intra-
industrial trade within and among MNCs in China and Southeast Asia as
well as entrepot trade. It is significant to note that considerable double
counting is involved, as many products, especially electronic products, cross
borders twice or more, thereby grossly inflating trade volumes. This double
counting is estimated to be as high as 30% in China-ASEAN trade. The latter,
however, has been an important asset in promoting development in the
Guangxi Autonomous Region and Yunnan Province in South-western China,
which are relatively backward compared with the country’s coastal
provinces. In recent years, foreign enterprises’ share of China’s exports has
60. Sheng Lijun, op. cit., p. 263.
61. Zhu Wenwei, “Zhongguo Dongmeng huwu maoyi shichang jiang jinyibu kaifang” (China and
ASEAN will further open their markets to goods), Zhongguo maoyibao (China trade) (Beijing),
12 January 2006.




85% of the articles of the Common
Effective Preferential Tariff of the
ASEAN Free Trade Area agreement
2001
Average tariff rates: about 14%
ASEAN member countries: 0%
China, Singapore, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Brunei, Thailand, 
Myanmar
90% of all merchandise




between the ASEAN Secretariat
and the Ministry of Agriculture of
the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) on Agricultural Cooperation
signed
2003
Protocol to Amend the Framework
Agreement on Comprehensive Eco-
nomic Cooperation Between
ASEAN and the PRC signed
2004
Reduction of tariff rates of 
agricultural products 
China-ASEAN Free Trade Area
Agreement on Trade in Goods of
the Framework Agreement on
Comprehensive Economic Coopera-
tion Between the ASEAN and the
PRC signed 
2005
Average tariff rates for WTO 
member countries: about 11%
China
All merchandise with reduced 
tariff rates
2006 ASEAN member countries: 0-5% Vietnam Below 82% of all merchandise
2008 ASEAN member countries: 0-5% Laos, Myanmar Below 82% of all merchandise
2010 ASEAN member countries: 0-5% Cambodia Below 82% of all merchandise
2011 Below 5% China-ASEAN Free Trade Area All merchandise










Table 4 – Progress of Tariff Reduction and Elimination within the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area
Source: “Zhongguo – Dongmeng ziyou maoyiqu bufen guanshui xiaojian shijianbiao” (Timetable for the tariff reduction and elimination for some merchandises within the China – ASEAN Free Trade Area),
China-customs.com, 1 January 2005, www.china-customs.com/html/afta/200501/01-1986.html (accessible on 20 March 2013).
N o . 2 0 1 3 / 2  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 63
been slowly declining to 52.4% in 2011 and 50.1% in the first eight months
of 2012, while the share of private and collective enterprises rose to 33.5%
in 2011 and 36.5% in the first eight months of 2012. (62)
Conclusion
In the early 1990s, Chinese leaders began to consider the regional aspects
of their foreign policy line; and soon they had to tackle the issue of China’s
participation in regional organisations. As indicated above, China rapidly
developed a sophisticated regionalism strategy in East Asia, as the region
is most important for China. Minimising the region’s “China threat” per-
ception has been a significant consideration in this strategy; and as the
“China threat” is increasingly perceived in economic terms, the economic
components of the strategy have become more important. After all, China
has been working hard to secure a peaceful international environment to
concentrate on its development; the development aspects have always
been accorded top priority. Hence regional economic integration emerges
as the core of China’s regional strategy in East Asia; economic considera-
tions have been the principal force pushing for regional integration as
demonstrated by the progress made in response to the regional and global
financial crises.
The escalation of tension concerning the territorial disputes over the
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea symbolised by a series
of high- profile naval exercises in the latter half of 2010 served to reinforce
the “China threat” perception and strengthen the hedging strategies of re-
gional countries, which have further intensified since then. The Obama ad-
ministration has been exploiting the situation in engineering the US’s “return
to Asia.” While China’s building of a “blue water” navy will continue to raise
the concern of its neighbours, China will probably put more emphasis on
the appeal of regional economic integration by offering more economic
concessions to ASEAN.
China is aware of its relative weakness in comprehensive national power,
and it has been keeping its options open while allowing ASEAN to hold the
initiative. Though never made explicit, China’s preferred scenario is a highly
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62. Pei Changhong et al., “2012 nian woguo maoyi xingshi fenxi yu yuce” (Analysis and Forecast of
China’s Trade Situation in 2012), in Chen Jiagui and Li Yang (eds.), “2013 nian zhongguo jingji xing-
shi fenxi yu yuce” [Economy of China Analysis and Forecast (2013)], Beijing, Social Sciences Ac-
ademic Press (China), December 2012, p. 172.
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Table 5 – Intra- and Extra-ASEAN FDI Inflow, 1995–2011 (US$ billion)
Sources: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2006, Jakarta, The ASEAN Secretariat, 2007; and Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2008,










Note: Figures may not add up to totals due to rounding.
Year Intra-ASEAN FDI Inflow Extra-ASEAN FDI Inflow ASEAN FDI from China ASEAN FDI from Japan
Amount % of Total Amount % of Total Amount % of Total Amount % of Total
1995 4.8 18.3 21.43 81.7 0.14 0.5 5.55 21.2
1996 4.56 15.1 25.64 84.9 0.12 0.4 5.28 17.5
1997 5.4 15.8 28.69 84.1 0.06 0.2 5.23 15.3
1998 2.97 13.3 19.43 86.7 0.29 1.3 3.94 17.6
1999 2.47 9 24.91 91 0.06 0.2 1.69 6.2
2000 0.76 3.2 22.96 97.6 -0.13 -0.6 0.5 2.1
2001 2.53 12.4 18.1 88.9 0.14 0.7 2.2 10.8
2002 3.81 21.2 13.97 77.5 -0.07 -0.4 3.03 16.8
2003 2.7 11.1 21.36 88.2 0.19 0.8 3.91 16.1
2004 2.96 8.4 32.24 91.2 0.74 2.1 5.67 16
2005 4.22 10.6 34.74 87.7 0.54 1.4 6.66 16.8
2006 7.6 13.8 45.77 83.3 1.02 1.8 10.22 18.6
2007 9.41 13.5 59.11 85.1 1.23 1.8 8.38 12.1
2008 11.07 18.3 49.36 81.4 1.5 2.5 7.65 12.6
2009 6.3 13.43 40.6 86.57 1.51 3.8 5.31 13.4
2010 14.32 15.52 77.9 84.48 1.85 4 3.79 8.1
2011 26.27 23.02 87.84 76.98 6.03 5.3 15.01 13.2
integrated East Asia comparable to the EU and NAFTA in terms of balance
of power, with China playing a significant or even a leading role. Chinese
leaders understand that there is a long way to go, and that actively seeking
leadership for China in the regional integration process could be counter-
productive. In view of the difficulties in Sino-Japanese relations, economic
integration in Northeast Asia has failed to make much progress. Hence
China’s approach has been economic integration within the Greater China
circle first, then China and ASEAN, leading to ASEAN Plus Three. Its most
demanding challenge is to help develop the institutional framework to pro-
mote regional integration. 
Meanwhile, China has been actively promoting sub-regional economic co-
operation such as development of the Greater Mekong Sub-region and the
Pan-Beibu Gulf Area. These projects generate more room for China’s initia-
tive and leadership, and attract less attention and resistance from the major
powers in the region. At the same time, China has been developing its soft
power projection capabilities. Though largely successful, in terms of re-
sources and history, it will take considerable time for China to catch up with
the US and Japan. Regional elites’ preference for educating their children at
leading American universities is perhaps one significant example.
Despite China’s impressive economic growth and its expansion of trade
with the region, its economic influence remains weak because its manufac-
turing industries are concentrated at the lower end of the value-added
chain. Certainly China’s enterprises will be working hard to upgrade them-
selves, moving upstream to research and design as well as downstream to
international distribution networks. China aims to secure a central role in
the regional economy and production networks in the intermediate future,
and it has the resources to do so.
If the Chinese leadership remains cautious and avoids being overly ambi-
tious, its regionalism strategy in East Asia will facilitate China’s economic
development and its attainment of major power status. It will serve to
weaken the various “hedging” strategies adopted by the big and small coun-
tries involved in the region as well as their economic protectionist measures,
as common interests will strengthen trust and overcome suspicion. Patience
and self-restraint are nevertheless essential, and they may be increasingly
difficult given rising nationalism in many regional countries, including China,
Japan, South Korea, and India.
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